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Abstract: - Auction mechanisms have arisen as very efficient methods for scarce resource allocations. For this 
reason there is a current research topic based on the application of these economics mechanisms to the design of 
communication networks, mainly in the provision of QoS to new multimedia services. The main research works 
are oriented to the assignment and pricing rules, that is, the network resource assigned to the user (the bandwidth 
on a link, or the route of a traffic demand) and the amount of money it is going to cost to him respectively. 
However, as far as we know, there is a little research focused in the analysis of the behaviour of the user. Note 
that an auction is in fact a competition where the user will behave selfishly in order to obtain the greater profit. 
In this paper we present the first results of a simulator which analyzes the behaviour of the user in an auction 
over a communication link. They obtain the revenue of the auctioneer that is the network provider, and the 
resource allocation under different schemes of user behaviour, from a very conservative character up to most 
risky behaviours. 
 
Key-Words: - Network capacity, congestion, auction, bidders´ behavior, and simulator. 
 
1   Introduction 
Internet network is composed by several 
interconnected autonomous systems (AS). Each one 
can be described as a specific network administrated 
by an independent entity. In our globalized world, a 
user works and communicates not only with users in 
his native network, but also with users in other 
networks. On the other hand, there is a lot of new 
multimedia services, as VoIP (voice over IP) or 
“Triple Play” services (telephone+Internet+TV) [1] 
which are demanding a guaranteed quality of service 
(QoS). QoS can be measured mainly in terms of 
bandwidth and transmission delay. The bandwidth is 
associated to the capacity of the transmission links 
and the delay depends critically on the route assigned 
to the demand of the user. Note that a very large route 
implies the traffic has to go through a large number 
of network elements and links and therefore the delay 
increases. 
The increasing bandwidth demand of the users causes 
a high probability of network congestion. In those 
situations, the network may not fulfill the QoS 
constrains of real time services. A feasible way to 
solve this problem may consist of prioritizing the 
traffic in the network. 
We could think of a system where the users prioritize 
their own traffic themselves.  Obviously this pattern 
would not work, because users (PC´s, autonomous 
systems or humans) will behave selfishly. Hence they 
will always establish the highest priority for their 
traffic because they would consider their own 
demands as the most important ones. This would take 
us again to a network congestion situation. A more 
effective strategy for resources assignment and 
control congestion may be based on traffic priority 
according to pricing. 
Pricing mechanisms have been broadly applied in 
communication networks [2]. Specifically, economic 
mechanisms, like auctions, have revealed as 
appropriate methods for assigning efficiently network 
resources to the users [3]. This assignment not only 
consists of bandwidth allocation but also routing 
inside a single provider (intra-domain) and/or through 
different autonomous systems (inter-domain) [4]. It is 
straight forward that these three problems have an 
increasing complexity as it is shown in Figure 1. 






























Figure 1 Network resources 
auctioning scenarios. 
 
An auction is composed of several parts: the 
auctioneer (network provider), the bidders (service 
providers and final users), the award auctioned (total 
transmission capacity through the network) and the 
assignment and pricing rules. A key factor is the 
bidders´ behavior because an auction is, in fact, a 
competition, where the users behave selfishly trying 
to obtain their maximal profit [5]. Our work consists 
of a study of the users´ behavior during the 
competition for transmissions resources in a 
communication network through auctioning. 
When the award auctioned is a single item, there is a 
unique winner of the process. But in our case, the 
award consists of a transmission capacity Q, which 
maybe divided in multiple units. Due to existence of 
network congestion, not all demands can be served 
and an allocation rule is needed. The allocation rule 
determines how to split and assign the resource, i.e. 
which bidders will access to the network and which 
capacity (qi) will use each one. Due to the limited 
transmission capacity of the network, resources 
assignment must fulfill the condition of the equation 
(1.1), where M users demand a portion of Q capacity. 
ai is the assigned capacity to the user i by the 
auctioneer. xi represents a binary value that is “one” 
when the user receives some capacity (is a winner of 
the auction) and “zero” in other case. Note that ai 
maybe does not correspond to the demanded capacity 
qi. Nevertheless ai ≤ qi
 







In auction mechanisms in economy environments 
with multiple goods, it is not always guaranteed that 
all winners pay the same price per unit. Pricing rule 
fixes the price ci to pay by each bidder i which 
receives a portion of the award.  
It is straightforward that bidders wish to pay as less 
as possible. On communications, the valuations of the 
bidders are private, the bidders and auctioneer do not 
know the valuation of others bidders. Each user i 
value the auctioned capacity qi in a different way.  
The value is represented as a valuation function θi. 
Figure 2 shows three types of valuation functions. 
Functions as case (A) corresponds to non-elastic 
demands, where the valuation does not change with 
the amount of capacity requested, whereas cases (B) 
and (C)  belong to situations of elastic demands. In 
(B) the valuation function has a constant gradient, 
more capacity is more valuated in a proportional way. 

















Figure 2 Valuation functions 
according to user’s capacity 
 
The auctioneer can assign the demanded capacity qi 
to the user i, or a value ai<qi. 
Let θi(qi)  the valuation function of the capacity qi of 
user i as θi(qi). The user always bids a price pi ≤ θi(qi) 
because of he wants to buy as cheap as possible. We 
denote the utility function (or user’s benefit) as the 
subtraction of the valuation of an assigned resource ai 
and the cost ci that the user pay for it. See the 
equation (1.2) where Ui means the utility function of 
user i. 
 i i iU (a ) ic= θ −   (1.2) 
As said before, in an auctioning process the bidders 
behave selfishly and untruthfully, bidding fewer 
amounts than they value the resource. 
On the other hand, the network provider wishes to 
maximize his revenue. The auctioneer will split the 
total resource Q in a manner that he gets the 
maximum profit, see equation (1.3), where again xi is 
equals to “one” if the user i  receives some capacity 
and “zero” in other case. 
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We also consider that the requirements of users 
change with time. A user i needs a capacity qi0 during 
a specific time period changing after. For example, 
consider the case where the user is in a video 
conference during a period, and when he finishes his 
needs are smaller, to send a data file by ftp for 
example. A video conference requests more capacity 
than simple data transmission with real time, so he is 
willing to pay more in the first case than in the 
second. Due the variability of the user’s needs, the 
network provider will perform several auctions per 
day in order to use more efficiently his facilities.  
Users´ behavior has a lot of influence on the results 
of auctioning because of the process implies 
competition of bidders. Our proposal is an auctioning 
simulator of competition for a transmission link of a 
communication network. The kind of auction is first-
price sealed bid. The simulator intends to analyze and 
compare different users´ behavior. 
The document is organized as follows: in section 2 
we describe the fundamentals of auctioning and the 
main types of auctions. Section 3 proposes a 
simulator of bidders´ behavior in a first-price sealed 
bid auction. We include a set of results obtained with 
the simulator and conclusions. In the last section, we 
comment on our future working lines. 
 
2   Auctions types 
Auctioning is a method of allocation scarce 
resources; it is based on the users’ competition. The 
auctioneer (the Service Provider in communications 
networks) wishes to get the largest benefit as 
possible, whereas the bidders want to pay as little as 
necessary [6]. 
The term “auction” means “to increase”, however, 
not all auctions processes have ascending price 
schemes. William Vickrey categorized the auctioning 
strategies into 4 types according to the manner the 
bids are put up [7]. 
 
2.1 English auction 
English auction is the standard method and also the 
most known. The valuation of the award is increasing 
from the beginning to the end of the process. The 
auctioneer starts revealing the lowest acceptable price 
for the goods to sell. He requests successively higher 
bids form the buyers until anyone wish to offer more 
than the latest sum. At this point the goods are 
assigned to the latest bidder. This kind of auction is 
very common when there is a single award, so there 
is a unique winner. 
The two main disadvantages are “winner’s curse” and 
collusions. “Winner’s curse” is produced when the 
bidder pays more than what the award is worth.1
 
2.2   Dutch auction  
A Dutch auction starts with an exceedingly high price 
for the item. The price is decreasing progressively 
until a buyer shows his interest to acquire it. When 
there are multiple units of an item, the bidders get in 
units with at lower prices successively until the units 
run out. The allocation and pricing rules of Dutch 
auctions are different to the English ones. During an 
English auction, a high interested buyer has more 
response time to buy, in the sense that if other bidder 
offers a higher price, the first one has the opportunity 
to pay more and get the item. In a Dutch auction, the 
very interested buyer must ahead of the rest of 
bidders. The first one which accepts the price, anyone 
more can get out the award. In this way, the 
auctioneer wins more usually in Dutch auctions than 
in English ones. 
 
2.3 First-price sealed-bid auction 
In a sealed bid auction, no others bidders know the 
bid price of anyone. The process has two stages: at 
first, the bidders inform to the auctioneer their bid 
prices and at second step the winners are announced. 
The term “first-price” specifies the allocation rule 
mentioned in the introduction. In the second stage, 
the bid prices are sorted from high to low. For single 
item, the winner is who bid the highest price, for 
multiple units, they are selected from this sorted list 
until the units are exhausted. Reynolds [2] refers to 
this characteristic as “discriminatory” because not all 
winners pay the same per unit. The bidder strategy 
will be to put near the winning bid prices interval but 
inside the lowest part, so he would pay less than the 
others. 
 
2.4   Vickrey auction  
Under a Vickrey auction, the price paid for each user, 
is the loss of declared welfare he imposes to others 
users due to his presence in the auction. This 
mechanism satisfies the following conditions: 
• Incentive compatibility: for each user, 
bidding truthfully is a dominant strategy. 
They present offers similar to their real 
valuation functions. 
                                                          
1 Collusions consist of the agreement 
among bidders (called “ring” in 
economy world), where they agree on a 
highest amount, and anybody bid more 
than this fixed amount. 
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• Individual rationality: each truthful bidder 
obtains a non-negative utility as equation 
(1.2). 
 
4   Implementation of simulator 
In this section we present the implementation of a 
simulator to auction specific network resources. It 
analyzes the users´ behavior in competition. As said 
before, we select the first-price sealed-bid auction. 
Sealed auctions are nearer to communication 
applications than English and Dutch ones. The 
computational complexity of a Vickrey auction is NP 
("Non-deterministic Polynomial time") whereas the 
complexity of a first-price sealed-bid auction is only 
polynomial time. We select first-price auctioning as 
an approximation of second-price one. 
The system is composed by the following parts: the 
network provider (the auctioneer), the transmission 
capacity of a single link (Q, the item to sell by 
multiple portions ai), and the potential users (PC´s, 
autonomous systems or humans, who are the M 
bidders). The link under analysis connects two any 
nodes N1 and N2 of a network. Figure 3 represents the 
described system. We considerer the link is under 
congestion, so the network provider must prioritize 
the traffic through auctioning. The assigned capacity 
by an auction must keep the equation (1.1) and also is 














Figure 3 Auction of M bidders for the 
capacity of a single link of a network. 
 
Consider a vector q = (q1, q2…qM) which 
represents the capacity bided by M users. Obviously 
they have different valuations of the demands so 
they are willing to pay different prices, named as p = 
(p1, p2…pM). Remember that bidders really want to 




We define that a user i has an offer range as show in 
Figure 4. He values the qi capacity as PMax,i, which is 
the valuation function θi(qi), whereas the user offers 
a value pi < PMax,i. PMin, represents a minimum of the 





Figure 4 Pricing ranges for offers 
from an individual user.  
 
The result of each auction is a set of winners who 
share the available capacity. Let us write the vector a 
= (a1, a2…aM) where ai means the assigned capacity 
to the bidder i. The vector a participate in equation 
(1.1). The cost of the assigned capacity is written as a 
vector c = (c1, c2…cM), that characterizes the price 
that users pay for the transmission service. 
Due to an auction is really a competition, the users´ 
behavior has a lot of influence on the results of the 
process, chiefly with successive auctions. We 
consider systems where bidders remember the results 
of the last auction. That means bidders fix their offers 
according to the capacity assigned in the last auction. 
The basic behave consists of increasing the price for 
next auction if they didn’t get any capacity, and 
decreasing the offered price if they got before some 
capacity. A first classification of bidders according to 
their behavior distinguishes three kinds of users: risk-
seeking (sometimes called risk-loving), risk-averse 
(or risk-hating) and neutral-risk users: 
- A risk-seeking bidder has high variation of 
pricing between two consecutive auctions, his 
behavior is aggressive in sense of he changes 
sharply prices. 
- Risk-averse bidders change slightly the price of 
the last auction, they have a previsible behavior.  
- Neutral-risk bidders have a middle behavior 
among risk-seeking and risk-averse one. 
 
Of course it is possible to expand this first 
classification finding new groups inside each large 
type. For example, risk-averse users can be more or 
less conservative. A conservative bidder never 
decreases his offered price, he only increases it if he 
didn’t get any capacity before. We establish the width 
of the decision window of these kinds of behaviors. 
- A risk-seeking user with a value “zero” of xi 
selects always a random bid between the previous 
pi and his valuation of the goods (PMax). See 
Figure 5(A) dotted area. The range from pi and 
PMax is named decision window. A risk-seeking 
bidder who won the previous auction fix his 
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following offer as a random price between pi and 
the minimum PMin as we can see in Figure 5(A) 
scratched area. In this case the decision window 
is the gap between pi and PMin. 
- A risk-neutral bidder behavior is showed in Figure 
5(B), where the decision window is the 50% of 
the risk-seeking one. If the user won the last 
auction then he selects a random price between 
last pi and (PMax). 
- Figure 6 represents behavior of risk-averse 
bidders. We assign a width of 20% for the 
decision windows. If the user has a value of xi 
equals 1, the behavior of conservative and non-
conservative users is the same (Figure 6 dotted 
areas). They increase the offer a random 
percentage from 0% to 20%. If the user has a 
value of xi=0 then only the non-conservative 
bidders decrease their following offers if they 
won the last auction, see Figure 6(A) scratched 
area whereas the conservative ones keep their 
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Figure 5 Behavior of bidders. (A) 






















Figure 6 Behavior of risk-averse 
bidders. (A) Non-conservative users; 
(B) Conservative users. 
 
5   Results 
A large set of experiments have been performed but 
for the sake of simplicity we are going to present only 
three considering the user´ classification mentioned 
above. We assume that winner always obtain the 
demanded capacity qi, it implies ai=qi. Next we define 
the three different simulation scenarios explained in 
this section. They are represented in Figure 7: 
• Scenario 1: all bidders are risk-neutral. 
• Scenario 2: 50% of users have risk-seeking 
behavior and 50% risk-averse (non-
conservative) one. 
• Scenario 3: distribution of population as 20% 
risk-seeking bidders; 30% of risk-neutral 
users; 25 % conservative and 25% non-













Seeking Neutral Non-conserv. Conserv.
 
Figure 7 Distribution of the 
population of the three different 
scenarios according the risk 
characteristic of users. 
 
The size of population is fixed to 40, as it may be the 
number of employers of a small-medium company 
that demands transmission facilities to a service 
provider. The auctioneer, that is, the service provider, 
auctions his capacity every 10 minutes during the 24 
hours of days. We have selected this time slot 
because this is the average duration of an ftp session. 
This frequency means 148 auctions per day. 
Therefore each simulation contains 150 auctions as 
approximation of this scenario. 
First we compare the total revenue of the service 
provider for the three scenarios. Figure 8 shows the 
accumulated revenue for each distribution. Note that 
scenario 3 contributes with a higher income to the 
auctioneer than the others, whereas scenarios 1 and 2 
produce similar revenue.  
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Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario3
 
Figure 8 Revenue of the service 
provider for scenarios 1, 2 and 3. 
 
Concerning scenario 2, Figure 9 shows the 
accumulated revenue produced by each set of users 
(risk-seeking and non-conservative ones) and the 
percentage of assigned capacity of each set of users 
represented by the striped and shadowed areas. After 
some transitory time, risk-averse bidders reach more 
capacity than the risk-loving ones. Note further that 
the risk-seeking group wins less capacity, paying 
more, than non-conservative group whose decision 
window is tighter (remember Figure 6). 
 















Seeking r Non conservative r Seeking Non conservative
 
Figure 9 Results of simulation with 
the scenario 2. 
 
Simulations with population from scenario 3 have 
some important conclusions obtained from Figure 10 
and Figure 11. The first one is that the system reaches 
stabilization after a transitory period. After 50 
auctions the capacity is allocated in the same average 
proportions: 40.5% of the goods are assigned to the 
conservative users; 26.5% are allocated to neutral 
bidders; 19.5% are assigned to risk-seeking and 
13.5% of the facilities are located to the non-
conservative users. This percentage is represented on 
the column F in Figure 10. The column A on the same 
figure represents the distribution of the total 
population. 
 



















Seeking r Neutral r Non conservative r Conservative r
Seeking Neutral Non conservative Conservative
F A
 
Figure 10 Accumulated revenue and 
assignment of capacity for scenario 3. 
(A) is the population distribution. (F) 
is the average proportion of winners. 
 
The curves on the figure mean the accumulated 
revenue per type of users. These revenues are 
proportional to the described column F in the sense 
that the biggest quantity comes from the mayor 
winners of auctions, the conservative one. More 
representative are the curves of Figure 11, where the 
accumulated revenue has been weight up users. In 
this way we have the revenue per user of each kind of 
risk and each auction. It is really interesting to see the 
risk-seeking bidders are who pay more individually 
however they receive always the least quantity of 
capacity. 
 

























Seeking r Neutral r Non conservative r Conservative r
Seeking Neutral Non conservative Conservative
 
Figure 11 Accumulated revenue per 
user with a population of scenario 3 
 
Finally, Figure 12 maps the allocation of capacity to 
the users on the three scenarios. The assignment is 
represented by a simple black dot in the user column. 
Rows represent consecutive auctions. Note that in the 
third scenario the conservative strategy is the best the 
conservative users obtain capacity in the majority of 
the auctions. This means that they get profit from the 
aggressive strategy of the risky users. 
 
6   Future research 
This paper shows the first results in the development 
of a simulator of the user behavior in auctions for 
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communication network resources. We have 
considered a single link with capacity constraints and 
different user characters. The bids of the users change 
with time depending on the past auctions and on their 
own natures. Under the defined conditions we can 
observe that the results tend to stabilize. The 
maximum revenue of the auctioneer is obtained in the 
real scenario due to the strong competition of the 
users. Note that the risk seeking users pay the highest 
individual amount although they obtain less capacity 
than the other groups. This situation is produced by 
the kind of auction. 
Regarding future work lines, the first research work 
consists of improving the simulator with new, and 
more realistic, behavior patterns, based mainly in 
Gaussian distributions. The assignment and pricing 
rules will be also improved changing the first price 
sealed mechanism by a Vickrey auction which 
satisfies the Nash criteria. Finally we will compare 
the results of the simulator with analytical studies 
derived from the application of modern heuristics to 
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Figure 12 Representation of the allocation to the users in the successive auctions in the considered 
scenarios. 
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